Managing Organisational Change

external Journal of macrocosm unbendableament concern Emerald Article Managing organisational convert in the earth heavens Lessons from the privatisation of the shopping centre pro arrest authorisation Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes Article breeding To cite this enrolment Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),Managing organisational castrate in the homosexuality empyrean Lessons from the privatisation of the station helper get, global Journal of national do simple(prenominal) focus, Vol. 14 Iss 2 pp. 94 wiz hundred ten Permanent link to this document http//dx. doi. org/10. 108/09513550110387381 D decl arloaded on 17-01-2013 References This document contains references to 56 varied documents Citations This document has been cited by 14 speciate documents To copy this document emailprotected com This document has been elaborateloaded 4884 times since 2005. * Users who d experienceloaded this Article e veryplacely downloaded * Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (200 1),Managing organisational permute in the state-supported domain Lessons from the privatisation of the position function histrionics, International Journal of popular Sector charge, Vol. 4 Iss 2 pp. 94 110 http//dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),Managing organisational win completely any everyplace in the national firmament Lessons from the privatisation of the Property returns Agency, International Journal of macrocosm Sector guidance, Vol. 14 Iss 2 pp. 94 110 http//dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 Ron Coram, Bernard Burnes, (2001),Managing organisational falsify in the unexclusive sphere Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency, International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 4 Iss 2 pp. 94 110 http//dx. doi. org/10. 1108/09513550110387381 ingress to this document was granted through and through an Emerald subscription provided by Edinburgh Napier University For Authors If you w ould like to write for this, or tot exclusively(prenominal)y a nonher(prenominal)wise Emerald payoff, then please character our Emerald for Authors prep ar. In ap gunpointation ab break how to deal which earthation to write for and submission guidelines atomic number 18 obtainable for all. Please visit www. emeraldinsight. com/authors for more than(prenominal)(prenominal) selective information. close to Emerald www. emeraldinsight. om With perpetuallyywhere forty long time experience, Emerald Group defecate is a affect in cypherent paper of global inquiry with jounce in business, society, macrocosm insurance and education. In fit, Emerald publishes over 275 journals and more than 130 book series, as healthful as an extensive prune of online products and service. Emerald is some(prenominal)(prenominal)(prenominal) COUNTER 3 and inventate compliant. The organization is a partner of the commission on Publication Ethics (COPE) and in whatsoeve r show window operations with Portico and the LOCKSS initiative for digital memorandum preservation. *Related content and download information correct at time of download.The trus devilrthy issue and full text muniment of this journal is available at http//www. emerald-library. com/ft IJPSM 14,2 94 Lessons from the privatisation of the Property Service Agency Manchester School of Management, UMIST, Manchester, UK Keywords organizational spay, Public field negociatement, Privatization, Government agencies, Public authority assets con Whilst organisational channelize appears to be happening with trade magnitude frequency and magnitude in both the earth and clandestine domains, close of the major(ip) studies of depart heighten on the toffee-nosed welkin and persist to derive their go unmatcheds to channel from that sphere.From a followup of the literary works, it is showd that in that respect is no sensation stovepipe instruction of life to manage or ganisational qualifying tho that in the ordinary eye(predicate) firmament organisations enquire to slang an antenna to remove which matches their gull aways and situation. The obligate polls the privatisation of the Property service Agency (prostate specific antigen) in order to function slimons as to how the ordinary sector brush off and should manage multi utmostiousness. It is verbalizen that the privatisation was characterised by a privation of clarity, an over-emphasis on pitchs to structures and procedures, and ply guard.However, underpinning this was an inappropriate glide slope to channelise. The article concludes that the main less(prenominal)ons of the prostate specific antigens privatisation be that, in more than(prenominal)(prenominal) circumstances, it is necessary to adopt an glide path to lurch which incorporates both the structural and ethnical aspects of reassign, and which substantiates the fate to appreciate and reply to cater fears and consults. Managing organisational qualifying in the universal sector Ron Coram and Bernard Burnes The International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14 No. 2, 2001, pp. 94-110. MCB University Press, 0951-3558 Introduction From Kurt Lewins work in the mid-forties to the pre direct tense day, organisational throw, as a dustatic march, has moved from cosmos a solveic of avocation to and a few academics and practiti wizrs to virtuoso that is identifyn as lying at the mall of organisational keep ( higher-ranking, 1997 Stickland, 1998). However, whilst organisational transfer appears to be happening with diverge magnitude frequency and magnitude in both the habitual and personal sectors, most of the major studies of and firees to qualify with approximately nonable exceptions (e. g.Pettigrew et al. , 1992) condense on the undercover sector and tend to derive their overturees to adjustment from that sector (e. g. Kanter et al. , 1992 Kotter, 1996 Mabey and Mayon-White, 1993 Pettigrew, 1985 Smith, 1997). non only does this underplay the enormous potpourris which exhaust interpreted place and atomic number 18 chronic to take place in the world sector, excuse it alike ignores the need to spr verboten startes to substitute which are in line of descent with the circumstances in which earth service organisations promptly find themselves (Flynn and Williams, 1997 Salauroo and Burnes, 1998).though thither shit been both(prenominal) healthy-publicised examples of public sector channelize projects which wipe surface g genius badly misemploy (Brindle, 1999), in that location is no evidence to show that public sector managers are, inherently, any less capable of managing variety show than their occult sector counterparts (Ferlie et al. , 1996). However, the challenges they face are different from those of their private sector counterparts, especially in price of public accountability, demonstrating take t o be for m unityy, and in skirmish the transform magnitude expectations, regarding service levels and quality, of both the global public and politicians.Over the last 20 years, one of the most evidentiary challenges that public sector managers seduce had to cope with, and one which has interpreted them into incomprehensible territory, has been that the boundary amidst the public and private sector has start out counter commute magnitudely hazy (Crouch and Streeck, 1997 Flynn, 1993). In the UK, which has tended to be at the forefront of these bring outments, whatever public services, or parts of them, shit been and are be fix up out to private cast (e. g. he management of some(a) schools and local education authorities) in condition(a) cases, public bodies surrender been turn into quasi-independent organisations (e. g. the Benefits Agency) and, in other causes, some organisations obligate been and are existence privatised in their entirety (e. g. public util ities). in all these forms of organisational permute throw up their own dilemmas and challenges, and they all bring an climb up to change which is appropriate to the circumstances k nonty. However, as Dunphy and Stace (1993) argued, there is no one entree which is capable for all circumstances and impersonals.This article examines one particular and major form of organisational change which continues to have a large impact on the public sector privatisation. It contractes upon the Property go Agency (prostate specific antigen) which, until its privatisation in the primal 1990s, was trusty for the gimmick, victuals and management of all the UK governing bodys buildings and s rate. By presenting a case direct of the privatisation of the prostate specific antigen, the article designks to nonpluss lessons as to how the public sector croup and should manage change.The article begins by reviewing the literature on change management. In particular, it draws wariness to the need to recognise that there is no one best guidance to manage organisational change. This is followed by a verbal definition of the background to our research on the prostate specific antigen, and the unveiling of the case read itself. As the concomitant tidings section shows, the privatisation of the prostate specific antigen was characterised by a wishing of clarity, an over-emphasis on changes to structures and procedures, and round resistance.netherpinning this was an inappropriate cuddle to change. In conclusion, the article argues that the main lessons of the prostate specific antigens privatisation are that, in much(prenominal) circumstances, there is a need to adopt an approach to change which balances the structural and pagan aspects of change, especially the need to appreciate and reply to mental faculty fears and concerns. Approaches to change management As Stickland (1998, p. 14) remarks F F Fthe enigma with per utilize change is that it parades acro ss more able domains under umerous guises, such as shift key, development, metamorphosis, transmutation, evolution, regeneration, innovation, slip and transition to name only when a few. Organisational change in the public sector 95 IJPSM 14,2 96 Especially over the last 20 years or so, as the maltreat and magnitude of organisational change appears to have accelerated, there has been a signifi cigarettet increase in the follow of approaches to change management on offer (see Buchanan and Boddy, 1992 Buchanan and Storey, 1997 Burnes, 2000 cummings and Worley, 1997 Dawson, 1994 Kanter et al. 1992 Pettigrew et al. , 1992 Senior, 1997 Stace and Dunphy, 1994 Stickland, 1998 Wilson, 1992). Nevertheless, most writers tend to fall into one of two broad camps those who support the think approach to change and those who espouse the sudden approach. The plan approach originated in the 1940s from the work of Kurt Lewin (Lewin, 1947). Subsequently, it was adopted by, and became the central rivet of, the presidential term Development (OD) movement (French and Bell, 1995).However, in the mid-eighties, as a result of increasing criticism of the plan approach, the emerging approach to change came to the fore. Its proponents argued that the Emergent approach was more suitable for the fighting(a) and unpredictable conditions confront by organisations in the late 20th century. The following briefly examines, and attempts to put into perspective, both these approaches to change in order to piece the ground for presenting and discussing the privatisation of the prostate specific antigen. plan change summary and criticisms aforethought(ip) change is an iterative, cyclical, address involving diagnosis, action and evaluation, and raise action and evaluation. It is an approach which maintains that once change has taken place, it must be self-sufficing (i. e. safe from regression). The drive of aforethought(ip) change is to improve the effectiveness of the huma n positioning of the organisation by steerage on the slaying of assorts and teams. Central to blind drunk change is the stress placed on the cooperative spirit of the hange effort the organisation, managers, recipients of change and change agents jointly diagnose the organisations problem and jointly plan and design the specific changes. Underpinning Planned change, and and then the origins of the OD movement as a whole, is a strong humanistic and democratic orientation and an emphasis on improving organisational effectiveness. The main criticisms levelled against the Planned approach to change are, as Burnes and Salauroo (1995) point out, as follows.First, Planned change was developed specifically for, and in response to, outmatchdown, autocratic, rigid, rule- prime organisations operating in a somewhat predictable and controlled environs. However, an increasing number of writers argue that, in the libertine and chaotic founding in which we live, such assumptions a re increasingly tenuous and that organisational change is more a unbroken and unrestricted process than a set of discrete and self-contained all the same(p)ts (Garvin, 1993 Hatch, 1997 Nonaka, 1988 Peters, 1989 Stacey, 1993 Wooten and White, 1999).Second, and on a connatural note, a number of writers have criticised the Planned approach for its emphasis on incremental and isolated change, and its inability to incorporate radical, vicissitudeal change (Dunphy and Stace, 1993 Harris, 1985 Miller and Friesen, 1984 Schein, 1985). Third, Planned change is implant on the assumption that commons accordance hobo be reached, and that all the parties voluminous in a particular change project have a testamentingness and interest in doing so.This assumption appears to ignore organisational remainder and politics, or at least assumes that problem issues can be easily secern and resolved. However, as Pfeffer (1981 1992) showed, conflict and personal and group self-interest do play an all important(predicate) fiber in what changes take place and who benefits from them. Fourth, it assumes that one type of approach to change is suitable for all organisations, all situations and all times. Dunphy and Stace (1993, p. 905), on the other hand, argue that roiled times demand different responses in varied circumstances.So managers and consultants need a position of change that is basically a situational or contingency model, one that indicates how to change change strategies to hand optimum fit with the changing milieu. Organisational change in the public sector 97 Leading OD advocates, as aptitude be anticipate, divergence these criticisms and point to the way that Planned change has tried to incorporate issues such as power and politics and the need for organisational transformation (Cummings and Worley, 1997 French and Bell, 1995).Nevertheless, as criticisms of the Planned approach mounted, supporters of the Emergent approach gained ground. Emergent chang e summary and criticisms thither are more writers who have contributed to the development of the Emergent approach, notably Dawson (1994), Kanter et al. (1992), Kotter (1996), Pettigrew (1985) and Wilson (1992). Unlike the supporters of the Planned approach, the main proponents of the Emergent approach are a more more diverse group who are separated by both geographic and disciplinary divides. Nevertheless, they would, more or less, throw that the main tenets of Emergent change are as follows .Organisational change is a continuous process of experiment and adaptation seted at matching an organisations capabilities to the needs and dictates of a propellantal and indistinct environment. . Though this is best acquired through a multitude of ( in the first place) small- to medium-scale incremental changes, over time these can lead to a major re-configuration and transformation of an organisation. . counterchange is a multi-level, cross-organisation process that unfolds in an it erative and mussy fashion over a purpose of years and comprises a series of ignition interlock projects. . remove is a semi semipolitical-social process and not an analytical-rational one. The role of managers is not to plan or implement change per se, but to effect or foster an organisational structure and humor which encourages and sustains experimentation, learning and risk-taking, and IJPSM 14,2 . 98 . to develop a workforce that will take responsibility for let outing the need for change and implementing it. Although managers are expected to become facilitators rather than doers, they withal have the prime responsibility for developing a bodied vision or common purpose which gives direction to their organisation, and in spite of appearance which the justness of any proposed change can be judged.The key organisational activities which allow these elements to lock up successfully are information-gathering somewhat the external environment and internal objectives a nd capabilities communication the transmission, analysis and discussion of information and learning the ability to develop rising skills, identify appropriate responses and draw knowledge from their own and others past and present actions. Though not always verbalise explicitly, the case for an Emergent approach to change is based on the assumption that all organisations live on in a turbulent, dynamic and unpredictable environment.Therefore, if the external world is changing in a fast and uncertain way, organisations need to be continuously scan their environment in order to identify developments and respond appropriately. Though ultimately leading to organisational transformation, to be successful, it is argued, change needs to come out of the closet locally and incrementally in order to respond to threats and opportunities thrown up by environmental instability. Because this is a continuous, open-ended and bottom-up process, the Planned approach to change is inappropriate. This leads to the outset of lead major criticisms of the Emergent approach it is specifically riged on the assumption that all organisations operate in a dynamic environment which requires continuous transformation. It is, by its own definition, not applicable to organisations operating in steadfast environments where fine-tuning is the order of the day, or those whose circumstances require major changes through the use of rapid and coercive measures.The second criticism relates to the release among these two approaches. The Planned approach is attacked because of its advocacy of Refreezing organisations after they have been changed (Kanter et al. , 1992). However, if one examines the process of change advocated by, for example, Dawson (1994), Kotter (1996) and Pettigrew et al. (1992), though they argue to the contrary, they do speak of change as a transition process which does have a beginning, middle and end. Indeed, as Hendry (1996, p. 24) comments sugar any account of crea ting and managing change and the mood that change is a triplestage process which ineluctably begins with a process of unfreezing will not be far below the surface. The last(a) exam criticism concerns the emphasis that advocates of the Emergent approach place on the political and heathen aspects of change. Though undoubtedly politics and socialisation do play a role in the change process, a number of writers have begun to criticise what they regard as the overemphasis placed on these aspects of change. Hendry (1996, p. 21), for example, argues that The management of change has become F F F overfocused on the political aspects of change, whilst collins (1998, p. ampere-second), voicing concerns of his own and of other researchers, argues that F F F in reacting to the problems and critiques of the Planned approach, managers and practitioners have swung from a dependence on under-socialized models and explanations of change and instead have become committed to the arguments of, w hat expertness be called, oversocialized models of change. Organisational change in the public sector 99Therefore, though it has apparent advantages over the Planned approach, or rather it is applicable to situations for which Planned change is not suitable, an examination of the Emergent approach reveals that it not free from serious criticism. putting change into perspective In examining the Planned and Emergent approaches to change, what we can see is that they focus on different aspects of organisations and are applicable to different situations. The Planned approach is chiefly aimed at improving group effectiveness, tends to have a top-down orientation and is most suitable for stable environments.The Emergent approach, on the other hand, tends to focus on organisational transformation through continuous change and seems more suited to turbulent environments. This means that, patronage their other strengths and weaknesses, both are essentially situational approaches suitable only for particular situations. In addition, it is to a fault agnize that, even taken together, the two approaches do not height all the broad spectrum of change events which organisations encounter. Senior (1997), for example, rawing on the work of Grundy (1993), identifies three categories of change tranquil incremental covering slow, systematic, evolutionary change bumpy incremental pertaining to periods where the smooth flow of change accelerates and discontinuous change. Cummings and Worley (1997) identify a continuum ladder from incremental change to quantum change. Dunphy and Stace (1992), in a ensampleised but more flesh out way, identify a four-stage change continuum that comprises fine-tuning, incremental adjustment, modular transformation and corporate transformation.Storey (1992) offers a four-fold typology of change (1) Top-down systemic change. This is aimed at transforming the organisation. (2) Piecemeal initiatives. These are devised and implemented by depar tments or sections in an unconnected fashion. (3) negociate for change. This is where a series of keisters are jointly agreed between managers and workers, but are pursued in a by small degrees fashion. (4) Systemic jointism. This is where managers and workers agree a total package of changes intentional to achieve organisational transformation.IJPSM 14,2 100 Kanter et al. (1992), addressing the issue of transformational change, have noted that it can be achieved both by a Bold Stroke approach (rapid overall change) or a Long defect approach (incremental change leading to transformation over an extended period of time). In a similar vein, Beer and Nohria (2000) make an evoke contribution to the change debate. Based on over 40 years of canvass the nature of corporate change, they identify two basic archetypes, or theories of change surmisal E and possibleness O.The main objective of possibility E change is to exploit stockholder value. It is applied in situations where a n organisations performance has diminished to such an extent that its main shareholders demand major and rapid change to improve the organisations fiscal performance. Typically this is a hard approach based on downsizing, divestment of non-core or low-performing businesses, and the heavy use of fiscal incentives. Theory O, on the other hand, is alike aimed at improving an organisations performance but his is more a soft approach which is based on developing the organisations purification and its human capabilities, and promoting organisational learning. Beer and Nohria (2000) believe that both of these are valid models of change but that both have their flaws. Theory E can achieve short-term financial gains but at the cost of denuding an organisation of the human capabilities and organisational culture necessary for long-term survival. Theory O, whilst focusing on these, falls into the block of not restructuring to concentrate on core activities, thus failing to gear shareholder value.To achieve the gains of both these approaches, whilst avoiding the pitfalls, Beer and Nohria advocate using these in tandem by focusing on the rapid restructuring elements of Theory E but following this with the human efficacy development offered by Theory O. Although similar to Kanter et al. s (1992) Bold Strokes and Long knock against, this idea goes beyond most other writers by pointing out that it is possible and sometimes necessary to combine approaches to change, rather than argumentation for some sort of universal approach.In net this review of the literature on organisational change, three issues need to be emphasised, which are as follows (1) There are a abundant variety of approaches to change, though some tend to be more popular than others. (2) As Burnes (1996) argues, there is no one best way to manage change. All the approaches on offer appear to be situational, i. e. express in terms of the circumstances in which they are effective. Therefore, managers ne ed to choose an approach which is suitable for their situation rather than assume that what worked in the past will too work in the coming(prenominal). 3) In some situations, it may be necessary to combine, all concurrently or sequentially, different approaches to change. Having identify the main issues with regard to the literature on change, we can now proceed to examine how the prostate specific antigen managed change in apply. This will commence with a brief verbal description of the background to our research, and the methods employed. Background and methods This article is based on research carried out between 1995 and 1998 by the authors into the process and consequences of the privatisation of the Property Services Agency.The research had two main objectives (1) To identify the reasons for, and the process of, the privatisation of the prostate specific antigen. (2) Post-privatisation, to examine the impact of the immature arrangements on relations between disposal ac tivity departments and the newly-privatised prostate specific antigen. As mentioned in the Introduction, this article is have-to doe with with the first objective, the process of privatisation. For a review of the impact of privatisation on relations between political sympathies departments and the privatised prostate specific antigen, see Burnes and Coram (1999).Looking at the design of the research and the methods used to study the changes at the prostate specific antigen, the aim of the research was to construct a mainly qualitative case study of what took place. This was based on principles and methods of research advocated by writers such as Denzin and Lincoln (1998), Robson (1993) and Yin (1994). Though documentary evidence was collected, such as press reports, extracts from parliamentary debates, internal PSA documents and the subject size up Office reports into the bargain of the PSA (NAO, 1995 1996), the main source of selective information came from interviews with th ose most closely involved with the process.These ferine into louvre groups (1) Senior civil servants within the responsible for(p) for managing and privatising the PSA. (2) Senior civil servants responsible for managing and procuring property and property services for government departments. (3) Senior civil servants in the bodies responsible for advising departments on purchasing constitution. (4) Directors and operational faculty in the privatised companies, the majority of whom were former PSA employees. (5) The Civil Service trade compacts involved in the privatisation negotiations.In total, some 50 individuals were interviewed. The interviews were taperecorded and transcripts sent to the interviewees for checking and correction. In addition, a draft of the final exam report of the research was sent to the interviewees for comment. These selective information formed the basis of the following description of the privatisation process. Organisational change in the public se ctor 101 IJPSM 14,2 102 The privatisation of the Property Services Agency (PSA) Background The origins of the PSA can be traced to 1962 when the Ministry of PublicBuildings and Works was make responsible for maintaining all the UK governments civil buildings. A year later, the Ministry was unify with the Works Directorates of the Admiralty, War Office and rail line Ministry. The merger increased the Ministrys workforce to over 60,000. With the creation of the Department of the Environment (DoE) in 1970, it was decided that the responsibility for verbalism and maintenance services should become the responsibility of a separate agency and thus the Property Services Agency was born.Its role was to F F F provide, manage, maintain, and furnish the property used by the government, including defence establishments, offices, courts, research laboratories, reproduction centres and land (PSA, 1988, inside cover). In the 1960s and 1970s, few questioned whether or not such activities were b est carried out by the public sector, but in the eighties the tide of opinion began to turn (Crouch and Streeck, 1997). Claims of bureaucratic in efficacy and waste in the UK public services were nothing new (Chapman, 1978 Fulton, 1968 Plowden, 1961).However, what was new, with the election of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister in 1979, was that tackling bloated, wasteful, overbureaucratic, and underperforming public services became the centrepiece of government policy (Ferlie et al. , 1996, p. 11). Subsequently, successive Conservative governments seek to deliver better value for money in public services through measures such as privatisation, outsourcing and compulsory competitive tendering (Flynn, 1993 Horton, 1996).Not surprisingly, give its size and importance, but most of all given the fact that it seemed to be carrying out a role that in other sectors of the economy was carried out by the private sector, the PSA became a prime target for reform. The process of privatisatio n In retrospect, it is possible to see that the process of privatising the PSA went through sextette key stages and began well in farm of the actual announcement that it was to be privatised . set up 1.In order to increase the commercial efficiency of the PSA, in 1986 the government appointed the consultancy firm Deloitte to develop and introduce new news report and management information systems. These new systems were designed to allow the PSA to operate along private sector lines and to abandon public sector practices which were seen as uncommercial. . Stage 2. In 1987, it was announced that, from April 1988, civilian departments of government could take responsibility for commissioning their own construction projects with a value of over ? 150,000.The Ministry of self-abnegation was allowed to follow suit in April 1990. In effect, . . . . this meant that the PSA was going to have to stir alongside private sector companies for government work. Stage 3. In 1988, the Secretar y of take for the Environment announced that the PSA would in future operate on a commercial basis. This is to say that its income, and indeed its survival, would depend on gaining work from government departments in the face of private sector competition. To hurry this, the PSA was restructured into a number of separate business functions.In addition, in order to make headway a more commercial orientation, a railway line Development Directorate was launch within the PSA. The consultants Price Waterhouse were appointed to operate alongside the new Directorate to function the PSAs commercial development by, among other things, training staff in business accounting, financial management, business planning, tidy sum management, customer bang and marketing. Stage 4. In September 1989, the government announced that the PSA was to be privatised.In June 1990, the code necessary to enable this to take place was passed. Stage 5. In October 1990, in zeal for privatisation, the PSA w as restructured into three main businesses PSA Projects, PSA Building Management (which was in conclusion split into five separate companies), and PSA International (which, in the end, was closed down rather than sold). Stage 6. PSA Projects was privatised in 1992. This was followed in 1993 by the sale of the five companies which comprised PSA Building Management. Organisational change in the public sector 103The above presents the privatisation of the PSA as a comparatively aboveboard and well- plan process. However, this is far from the reality of what happened. First, it must be recognized that most of the above actions were impose on the PSA rather than arising from the decisions of its own management. Second, the six stages focused very much on changes to structures and procedures whilst paying minor attention to the need for attitudinal, behavioural and ethnic changes or, indeed, the reply of the PSAs staff to the notion of privatisation.Finally, as the following will explain, the move to privatise the PSA was far slower and much messier than either the government or the PSAs management had allowed for. The pace of privatisation As the following quotation from a director of one of the privatised companies indicates, the privatisation of the PSA took longer, and was more difficult, than expected The privatisation process was a very lengthy process.It was much longer than it was before intended to be and meant that the natural anxiousness and nervousness that occurs during such periods was prolonged. IJPSM 14,2 104 The main reasons for this lag were twofold. Lack of strategical direction. At first, the PSAs come on appeared to treat privatisation as a standard public sector change broadcast which could be planned in advance, penalize in a straightforward way with few unforeseen problems, and which staff would accept, even if they did not like it. However, this proved to be far from the case.The PSAs jury brought in a firm of consultants to h elp them to clarify the PSAs strategic direction but, as this remark by PSAs then Deputy Chief decision maker demonstrates, the result seemed somewhat unfocused For example, we did a lot of work on objectives. I dont think I can think about what we boiled it down to in the end, F F F something like to go forward the maximum number of viable longterm jobs. any(prenominal) the merits or not of the work the Board did, the middle and lower reaches of the PSA seemed more alarmed than consoled by developments.It was also the case that even where positive decisions were taken by the top, such as a committedness to provide retraining and outplacement support for staff, they represent it difficult to put them into practice. One former PSA Director stated that There were a few things like that the training where I think the best intentions at the top were weakened by people underneath, and I didnt know why. The difficulties faced by top management in developing a new strategy for the PSA and in pushing forward the pace of privatisation were threefold.The first was that though, as civil servants, they had been brought up in a stable environment which operated by well-understood rules, they found themselves having to transform the organisation into a commercial entity that could be successful whilst not understanding the nature of competition nor ever feeling in control of the pace of change. The second was that, having been used to running a bureaucratic organisation with compliant staff, they found themselves attempting to construct a more limber and entrepreneurial body with an increasingly dissatisfied and worried workforce.The last was that, their actions were being located and judged by their political masters, whose sole concern appeared to be to privatise the PSA as quickly as possible, no reckon what it cost or who was offended. Therefore, ranking(prenominal) managers found themselves caught between the politicians confide for speed and their staffs des ire for job security, both of which clashed with their own sleepless and rule compulsive approach to change. Resistance by PSA employees. This was the second main reason for the deceleration of the privatisation process.The majority of PSA employees did not loss their organisation privatised. Not only did they value the stability and certainty that running(a) for a government body gave them, but also most believed that the PSA had little knock of survival in the private sector. As one of their trade alliance officials put it The implications of privatisation for staff, in respect of pensions, severance terms, frequent pay and conditions, were enormous. What happens if the organisation who took them over went split at some later consider?The result of this uncertainty and fear for their future was that staff sought to resist and withstand privatisation. On an individual basis, many staff resisted by withholding information and decrease down the process wherever possible. F or example, some staff basically gave up work and devoted all their time to inquisitive for another job, whilst others fabricated rumours. There was also a general increase in union militancy. On a collective basis, the PSA staff trade union decided to oppose the privatisation.As one union official commented F F F we felt and still feel that if you are providing a service for the public sector and using taxpayers money, that its quite inappropriate to have this work carried out by organisations making a profit. Organisational change in the public sector 105 The official also went on to state that it was union policy to delay the privatisation F F F the idea was that the longer it took, the longer people were in the public sector.There were issues about information, about negotiation over what the implications of the sale would be for staff, and obviously, from that point of view, the idea of slowing the process down wasnt one that we were objecting to. Eventually this resistance be came overt and staff took industrial action, including working to rule and strikes. In a previous(a) attempt to defuse staff confrontation to privatisation, the government devised a staff preference scheme whereby PSA staff could choose to transfer fully to the privatised companies, to be seconded to them for a limited period, or to take early on retirement.The staff choice scheme also protected employees pension entitlements. Though this defused some of the opposition, it was not until after the 1992 General Election, when many people mistakenly as it turned out expected a change of government, that staff finally accepted the inevitableness of privatisation. As can be seen, the PSAs privatisation was characterised overall by uncertainty, delay and a lack of any clear strategic direction (other than to privatise it). The entire process was impelled by one unquestionable aim privatisation.The process, cost and consequences of privatisation were all subordinate, and, in some moxies, irrelevant to achieving that one aim. Though clear in itself, the aim provided no guidance as to how it was to be achieved nor, importantly, did it offer any direction for what was to take place afterwards. As for the PSAs strategy, instead of clarity and purpose, what developed was a stream of unplanned, ad hoc and muddled decisions made in reaction to events, rather than in anticipation of them.Discussion Though it is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the merits or differently of the decision to privatise the PSA, it is important to recognise that the wave of privatisation seen in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s was essentially based on a IJPSM 14,2 106 political belief that the private sector, driven by competitive pressures, was far better at delivering value-for-money services than the public sector (Crouch and Streeck, 1997 Ferlie et al. , 1996 Flynn, 1993).Consequently, the privatisation of the PSA, like other privatisations, was not driven by some form of ra tionaleconomic decision-making process, but by a political agenda aimed at transferring parts of the public sector to the private sector. Consequently, successive governments were less concerned with the process of change, or indeed its cost, than with ensuring that the transfer took place. It is not surprising, then, that the PSAs staff should have felt resentment and a sense of betrayal that, after many years of public service, their careers and livelihoods were threatened by what appeared to them to be ideological dogma.This put the senior managers of the PSA in a situation for which they were ill-prepared and had little experience. They had to plan for, and get staff to survey with, a proposition for which they themselves seemed to have little sympathy and over which, in the final analysis, they felt they had little control. To achieve privatisation, they attempted to apply the sort of rational-planned approach to change which had worked for them when undertaking change in the past. scarce past changes had been undertaken within a relatively stable public sector environment, with a compliant workforce and with few probable losers.Unfortunately, the governments policy in this instance was driven by mainly ideology rather than rationality. It was designed to remove the PSA from the public sector, the workforce were afraid and hostile, rather than compliant, and there were a great number of emf losers. It was also the case that the senior echelons of the PSA appeared themselves to be apprehensive and lacking in support for the privatisation. Therefore, not surprisingly, senior managers found it difficult to devise and put their plans into practice when faced with an uncertain environment and a hostile staff.As time passed, three factors came to the fore which ensured that privatisation was completed (1) In order to achieve its objective of privatising the PSA, the government eventually recognised it would need to be pragmatic as to how this was achieved and its cost. (2) The PSA management abandoned its planned approach to change and, basically, adopted a reactive and ad hoc approach to overcoming the barriers to privatisation traffic with them as they arose and being prepared to be flexible in most aspects of the process. 3) later the 1992 General Election produced no change of government or policy, it became clear to staff that the privatisation of the PSA was inevitable. As can be seen, in terms of strategic change, this was an instance where there was a clear, though limited, objective, but no clear or lucid strategy for achieving it. It is highly debatable whether or not the privatisation of the PSA has produced any measurable benefits to the UK taxpayer. Certainly the governments own National Audit Commission (NAO, 1995 1996) was critical of the cost and process of the PSAs privatisation.Also, whilst most organisations in the private sector appear convinced that closer, less hostile and longer-term working relationships between customers and suppliers are the way to achieve best value for money, this does not seem to be the case in terms of the public sectors relations with the privatised PSA or other companies in the construction industry (Burnes and Coram, 1999). As far as change management was concerned, what we can see is that the PSAs managers attempted to apply the sort of quick, top-down, mechanistic approach to change which had previously worked well in the relatively stable world of the public sector.However, the PSA was moving into unacknowledged territory, the private sector, which was far more dynamic and unpredictable than it was used to. Also, it needed to achieve two forms of change at the same time changes to structures, practices and procedures and changes to attitudes, behaviour and culture. Whilst the traditional top-down public sector approach might be suitable to the former, provided the environment was relatively stable, it was not suitable to the latter, regardless of the na ture of the environment.This meant that the PSAs leaders were attempting to take their staff into unknown territory, using an inappropriate approach and in a direction with which even they were plainly ill at ease. Conclusions As the literature review argued, there is no one best way to manage change. however because an approach was deemed appropriate and worked over a period of time does not mean it will work in all situations or for all time (Burnes, 1996). A top-down, planned approach may well be suitable for a stable, public sector bureaucracy, but if a need arises to move the same bureaucracy into the private sector, the same approach is unlikely to work.As Dunphy and Stace (1993, p. 905) remarked churning times demand different responses F F F Although the privatisation of the PSA is now a past event, the nature of the public sector and whether further elements of it should be privatised, or required to become more market-orientated, still form part of the current political agenda in most countries. Consequently, the lessons of the PSAs privatisation are still very relevant to those who make public policy and to those charged with carrying out the changes which such policies require of them. The main lessons are as follows.First, to prepare services for privatisation, or to operate on a more commercial basis, requires both structural and heathen change. As Allaire and Firsirotu (1984) showed, to achieve both requires different approaches with different timescales. A similar point was made by Beer and Nohria (2000), cited earlier, who call for a combination of Theory E and Theory O approaches to achieve such transformations. To focus on only one of these, as was the case with the PSA, is unlikely to achieve the benefits which policy makers expect, and taxpayers increasingly demand. Organisational change in the public sector 107IJPSM 14,2 108 Second, there is a need to win over staff, or at the very least to address their concerns and fears. A key elem ent in this is the need for policy makers to move beyond basing their decisions mainly on dogma or political creed, and instead, as OToole and Jordan (1995, p. 190) recommend, to base them upon a loaded identification of weaknesses and a considered plan to palliate those defects. As far as the PSA case was concerned, there was never really any attempt to win over staff or, until quite late in the process, to address their fears and concerns.The main reason for this was that the PSAs senior managers did not know how to promote a decision based on dogma, one which they had played no part in developing, and over whose consequences they had significant reservations. Third, it should also be noted that the PSAs management themselves did not be possessed of the skills or experience to manage such a change process. Although this was recognised by the provision of consultants to help with the more structural and technical changes, support for the more cultural aspects appears to have bee n ignored.Therefore, in conclusion, as can be seen, the PSAs privatisation was flawed and, some might consider, ill-conceived in the first place. However, this should not blind us to the important lessons it offers both policy makers and practitioners when considering and managing organisational changes in the public sector. form _or_ system of government makers rightly require and expect public sector employees to provide value for money. In turn, public sector employees have a right to expect policy makers to take decisions, and manage the consequences which flow from these, in such a way that it can be openly seen that value for money is their primary concern.References Allaire, Y. and Firsirotu, M. E. (1984), Theories of organisational culture, Organization Studies, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 193-226. 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